Paper #646
- Título:
- Price increase and stability with new entries in Cournot markets
- Autores:
- Ramon Villanova, Jaume ParadÃs, Pelegrà Viader y Joan Miralles
- Data:
- Octubre 2002
- Resumen:
- It is widely accepted in the literature about the classical Cournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi–competitiveness is linked, in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stable unique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolists as industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non–quasi–competitiveness implies, in the long run, instability is proved false.
- Palabras clave:
- Cournot equilibrium, non-cooperative oligopoly, quasi-competitiveness, stability
- Códigos JEL:
- D43,C62
- Área de investigación:
- Estadística, Econometría y Métodos Cuantitativos
- Publicado en:
- Keio Economic Studies, 48, 69-96, 2012
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