Paper #408

Título:

On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

Autores:

Esther Hauk y Sjaak Hurkens

Data:

Julio 1999

Resumen:

We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion of forward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the class of generic two player normal form games preceded by an outside option. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts (including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction.

Palabras clave:

Forward induction, strategic stability, EES sets, index theory

Códigos JEL:

C72

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía

Publicado en:

Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 106, Number 1, September 2002, pp. 66-90(25)

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