Paper #377

Título:

Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement

Autores:

Juan J. Ganuza y Lambros Pechlivanos

Data:

Enero 1998

Resumen:

When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design of the object being procured affects the resulting degree of competition. This paper highlights the interaction between the optimal procurement mechanism and the design choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the sponsor's design choice, instead of homogenizing the market to generate competition, promotes heterogeneity.

Palabras clave:

Procurement, project design, horizontal differentiation

Códigos JEL:

L51, H57, D44

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía

Publicado en:

Economic Letters, 67, (2000), pp. 105-112

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