Paper #219

Título:

Competitive location and pricing on networks

Autores:

Daniel Serra y Charles Revelle

Data:

Junio 1997

Resumen:

In this paper we consider a location and pricing model for a retail firm that wants to enter a spatial market where a competitor firm is already operating as a monopoly with several outlets. The entering firms seeks to determine the optimal uniform mill price and its servers' locations that maximizes profits given the reaction in price of the competitor firm to its entrance. A tabu search procedure is presented to solve the model together with computational experience.

Palabras clave:

Competitive location, discrete network location, spatial pricing

Códigos JEL:

C61, R32, L81, R12

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía

Publicado en:

Geographical Analysis, 31, 2, (1999)

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