Paper #209

Título:

Auctions of licences and market structure

Autor:

Gustavo Rodríguez

Data:

Febrero 1997

Resumen:

This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to operate in a market where those firms that obtain at least one licence then engage in a symmetric market game. I employ a new refinement of Nash equilibrium, the concept of {\sl Markovian recursively undominated equilibrium}. The unique solution satisfies the following properties: (i) when several firms own licences before the auction (incumbents), new entrants buy licences in each stage, and (ii) when there is no more than one incumbent, either the single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs in every stage, depending on the parameter configuration.

Palabras clave:

Auctions, game theory, industrial organization

Códigos JEL:

D44, C72

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía

Publicado en:

Economic Theory, 19, 283-309, 2002

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