Paper #169

Título:

Comparison of information structures

Autor:

Olivier Gossner

Fecha:

Mayo 1996

Resumen:

We introduce two ways of comparing information structures, say ${\cal I}$ and ${\cal J}$. First we say that ${\cal I}$ is richer than ${\cal J}$ when for every compact game $G$, all correlated equilibrium distributions of $G$ induced by ${\cal J}$ are also induced by ${\cal I}$. Second, we say that ${\cal J}$ is faithfully reproducable from ${\cal I}$ when all the players can compute from their information in ${\cal I}$ ``new information'' that they could have received from ${\cal J}$. We prove that ${\cal I}$ is richer than ${\cal J}$ if and only if ${\cal J}$ is faithfully reproducable from ${\cal I}$.

Palabras clave:

Game--theory, information, correlation

Códigos JEL:

C70, C72

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía

Publicado en:

Games and Economic Behavior, num. 30, pp. 44-63, 2000

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