Paper #1309

Título:

Choice by sequential procedures

Autores:

Jose Apesteguia y Miguel A. Ballester

Data:

Febrero 2012

Resumen:

We propose a rule of decision-making, the sequential procedure guided by routes, and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalently understood as special cases of this rule. In addition, the sequential procedure guided by routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related. We show that choice with a status-quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees, which, in turn, is also a refinement of sequential rationalizability. Thus, we provide a sharp taxonomy of these choice models, and show that they all can be understood as choice by sequential procedures.

Palabras clave:

Individual rationality, Bounded rationality, Behavioral economics.

Códigos JEL:

D01.

Área de investigación:

Economía Experimental y del Comportamiento / Microeconomía

Publicado en:

Games and Economic Behavior, 77: 90-99, January 2013

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