Paper #787
- Títol:
- Moral hazard and dynamics of insider ownership stakes
- Autor:
- Branko Urosevic
- Data:
- Febrer 2001
- Resum:
- In this paper, I analyze the ownership dynamics of N strategic risk-averse corporate insiders facing a moral hazard problem. A solution for the equilibrium share price and the dynamics of the aggregate insider stake is obtained in two cases: when agents can credibly commit to an optimal ownership policy and when they cannot commit (time-consistent case). In the latter case, the aggregate stake gradually adjusts towards the competitive allocation. The speed of adjustment increases with N when outside investors are risk-averse, and does not depend on it when investors are risk-neutral. Predictions of the model are consistent with recent empirical findings.
- Paraules clau:
- Corporate insiders, moral hazard, ownership dynamics
- Codis JEL:
- G14, G32, D43
- Àrea de Recerca:
- Finances i Comptabilitat
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