Paper #774

Títol:

Long-run selection and the work ethic

Autors:

Jens Josephson i Karl Wärneryd

Data:

Setembre 2004

Resum:

That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.

Paraules clau:

Work ethic, evolution, group selection, public goods, stochastic dynamics

Codis JEL:

C72, D23, H41, M14, Z13

Àrea de Recerca:

Microeconomia

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