Paper #377

Títol:

Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement

Autors:

Juan J. Ganuza i Lambros Pechlivanos

Data:

Gener 1998

Resum:

When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design of the object being procured affects the resulting degree of competition. This paper highlights the interaction between the optimal procurement mechanism and the design choice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the sponsor's design choice, instead of homogenizing the market to generate competition, promotes heterogeneity.

Paraules clau:

Procurement, project design, horizontal differentiation

Codis JEL:

L51, H57, D44

Àrea de Recerca:

Microeconomia

Publicat a:

Economic Letters, 67, (2000), pp. 105-112

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