Paper #373

Títol:

A general class of adaptative strategies

Autors:

Sergiu Hart i Andreu Mas-Colell

Data:

Març 1999

Resum:

We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan-consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other players; i.e., there is no "regret." Smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine [1995]) and regret-matching (Hart and Mas-Colell [1998]) are particular cases. The motivation and application of this work come from the study of procedures whose empirical distribution of play is, in the long-run, (almost) a correlated equilibrium. The basic tool for the analysis is a generalization of Blackwell's [1956a] approachability strategy for games with vector payoffs.

Paraules clau:

Adaptive strategies, approachability, correlated equilibrium, fictitious play, regret

Codis JEL:

C7, D7, C6

Àrea de Recerca:

Microeconomia

Publicat a:

Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 26-54, May 2000
Amb el títol:
A General Class of Adaptive Strategies

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