Paper #219

Títol:

Competitive location and pricing on networks

Autors:

Daniel Serra i Charles Revelle

Data:

Juny 1997

Resum:

In this paper we consider a location and pricing model for a retail firm that wants to enter a spatial market where a competitor firm is already operating as a monopoly with several outlets. The entering firms seeks to determine the optimal uniform mill price and its servers' locations that maximizes profits given the reaction in price of the competitor firm to its entrance. A tabu search procedure is presented to solve the model together with computational experience.

Paraules clau:

Competitive location, discrete network location, spatial pricing

Codis JEL:

C61, R32, L81, R12

Àrea de Recerca:

Microeconomia

Publicat a:

Geographical Analysis, 31, 2, (1999)

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