Paper #169
- Títol:
- Comparison of information structures
- Autor:
- Olivier Gossner
- Data:
- Maig 1996
- Resum:
- We introduce two ways of comparing information structures, say ${\cal I}$ and ${\cal J}$. First we say that ${\cal I}$ is richer than ${\cal J}$ when for every compact game $G$, all correlated equilibrium distributions of $G$ induced by ${\cal J}$ are also induced by ${\cal I}$. Second, we say that ${\cal J}$ is faithfully reproducable from ${\cal I}$ when all the players can compute from their information in ${\cal I}$ ``new information'' that they could have received from ${\cal J}$. We prove that ${\cal I}$ is richer than ${\cal J}$ if and only if ${\cal J}$ is faithfully reproducable from ${\cal I}$.
- Paraules clau:
- Game--theory, information, correlation
- Codis JEL:
- C70, C72
- Àrea de Recerca:
- Microeconomia
- Publicat a:
- Games and Economic Behavior, num. 30, pp. 44-63, 2000
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