Paper #167

Títol:

An axiomatization of the prekernel of nontransferable utility games

Autors:

Roberto Serrano i Ken Ichi Shimomura

Data:

Abril 1996

Resum:

We characterize the prekernel of NTU games by means of consistency, converse consistency, and five axioms of the Nash type on bilateral problems. The intersection of the prekernel and the core is also characterized with the same axioms over the class of games where the core is nonempty.

Paraules clau:

Prekernel, NTU games, consistency, converse consistency

Codis JEL:

C71

Àrea de Recerca:

Microeconomia

Publicat a:

Journal of Economic Theory, 83, 286-3071998
Amb el títol:
Beyond Nash Bargaining Theory: The Nash Set

Descarregar el paper en format PDF