Paper #1309

Títol:

Choice by sequential procedures

Autors:

Jose Apesteguia i Miguel A. Ballester

Data:

Febrer 2012

Resum:

We propose a rule of decision-making, the sequential procedure guided by routes, and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalently understood as special cases of this rule. In addition, the sequential procedure guided by routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related. We show that choice with a status-quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees, which, in turn, is also a refinement of sequential rationalizability. Thus, we provide a sharp taxonomy of these choice models, and show that they all can be understood as choice by sequential procedures.

Paraules clau:

Individual rationality, Bounded rationality, Behavioral economics.

Codis JEL:

D01.

Àrea de Recerca:

Economia Experimental i del Comportament / Microeconomia

Publicat a:

Games and Economic Behavior, 77: 90-99, January 2013

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