Paper #907
- Título:
- Existence of sparsely supported correlated equilibria
- Autores:
- Fabrizio Germano y Gábor Lugosi
- Fecha:
- Octubre 2005
- Resumen:
- We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover, the lower bound grows exponentially in the number of players N.
- Palabras clave:
- Correlated equilibrium, finite games
- Códigos JEL:
- C72
- Área de investigación:
- Microeconomía / Estadística, Econometría y Métodos Cuantitativos
- Publicado en:
- Economic Theory (2007) 32: 575-578
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