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Paper #783

Título:
Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium
Autores:
Sergiu Hart y Andreu Mas-Colell
Fecha:
Octubre 2004
Resumen:
In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su�ces to recall the last two periods of play.
Palabras clave:
Uncoupled, Nash equilibrium, stochastic dynamics, bounded recall
Códigos JEL:
C7, D83
Área de investigación:
Microeconomía
Publicado en:
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 57, Num. 2, p. 286-303, Nov. 2006

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