Paper #783
- Título:
- Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium
- Autores:
- Sergiu Hart y Andreu Mas-Colell
- Fecha:
- Octubre 2004
- Resumen:
- In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su�ces to recall the last two periods of play.
- Palabras clave:
- Uncoupled, Nash equilibrium, stochastic dynamics, bounded recall
- Códigos JEL:
- C7, D83
- Área de investigación:
- Microeconomía
- Publicado en:
- Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 57, Num. 2, p. 286-303, Nov. 2006
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