Paper #761

Título:

Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games

Autor:

Fabrizio Germano

Fecha:

Junio 2004

Resumen:

The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained with a fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experiments on rules and games.

Palabras clave:

Rules, evolutionary dynamics, stochastic dynamics, bounded rationality, learning, normal form games

Códigos JEL:

C72, C73, D81, D83

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía

Publicado en:

Theory and Decision (2007) 62: 311-333

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