Paper #744

Título:

What form of relative performance evaluation?

Autores:

Marco Celentani y Rosa Loveira-Pazó

Data:

Enero 2004

Resumen:

We study relative performance evaluation in executive compensation when executives have private information about their ability. We assume that the joint distribution of an individual firm’s profit and market movements depends on the ability of the executive that runs the firm. In the equilibrium of the executive labor market, compensation schemes exploit this fact to sort executives of di ?erent abilities. This implies that executive compensation is increasing in own performance, but may also be increasing in industry performance-a sharp departure from standard relative performance evaluation. This result provides an explanation for the scarcity of relative performance considerations in executive compensation documented by the empirical literature.

Palabras clave:

Executive compensation, relative performance evaluation

Códigos JEL:

D82, G30, J33, M52

Área de investigación:

Economía de la Empresa y Organización Industrial / Microeconomía

Publicado en:

Review of Economyc Dynamics, Vol 9, 525-540, 2006
Con el título:
A Simple Explanation of the Relative Performance Evaluation Puzzle

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