Paper #662

Título:

Pharmaceutical generics, vertical product differentiation and public policy

Autor:

Antonio Cabrales

Data:

Enero 2003

Resumen:

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in off-patent pharmaceutical markets using a vertical product differentiation model. This model can explain the observation that countries with stronger regulations have smaller generic market shares. It can also explain the differences in observed regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may be due to a higher proportion of production that is done by foreign firms. Finally, a closely related model can account for the observed increase in prices by patent owners after entry of generic producers.

Palabras clave:

Pharmaceutical industry, generics, vertical product differentiation

Códigos JEL:

I10, I18, L18, L65

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía / Economía Laboral, Pública, de Desarrollo y de la Salud

Númuero serie CRES:

27

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