Paper #629

Título:

Social preferences and skill segregation

Autores:

Antonio Cabrales y Antoni Calvó

Fecha:

Julio 2002

Resumen:

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small deviations from purely �selfish� preferences leads to widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers of different abilities tend to work in di�erent firms, as long as they care somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are �close�.

Palabras clave:

Contract theory, mechanism design, envy, social preferences, skill segregation

Códigos JEL:

A13, C72, D64, D80, J41

Área de investigación:

Economía Experimental y del Comportamiento / Economía de la Empresa y Organización Industrial / Microeconomía

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