Paper #593

Título:

Endogenous policy leads to inefficient risk sharing

Autores:

Marco Celentani, J. Ignacio Conde y Klaus Desmet

Data:

Enero 2002

Resumen:

We analyze risk sharing and fiscal spending in a two-region model with complete markets. Fiscal policy determines tax rates for each state of nature. When fiscal policy is decentralized, it can be used to affect prices of securities. To manipulate prices to their beneffit, regions choose pro-cyclical fiscal spending. This leads to incomplete risk sharing, despite the existence of complete markets and the absence of aggregate risk. When a fiscal union centralizes fiscal policy, securities prices can no longer be manipulated and complete risk sharing ensues. If regions are homogeneous, median income residents of both regions prefer the fiscal union. If they are heterogeneous, the median resident of the rich region prefers the decentralized setting.

Palabras clave:

Interregional risk-sharing, complete markets

Códigos JEL:

C72, D50, D72, E61

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía

Publicado en:

Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 7(3), pp 758-787, 2004

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