Paper #537

Título:

Resistance to reform: Reconsidering the role of individual-specific uncertainty

Autor:

Antonio Ciccone

Data:

Marzo 1998

Resumen:

Individual-specific uncertainty may increase the chances of reform being enacted and sustained. Reform may be more likely to be enacted because a majority of agents might end up losing little from reform and a minority gaining a lot. Under certainty, reform would therefore be rejected, but it may be enacted with uncertainty because those who end up losing believe that they might be among the winners. Reform may be more likely to be sustained because, in a realistic setting, reform will increase the incentives of agents to move into those economic activities that benefit. Agents who respond to these incentives will vote to sustain reform in future elections, even if they would have rejected reform under certainty. These points are made using the trade-model of Fernandez and Rodrik (AER, 1991).

Palabras clave:

Status-quo bias, bias against reform, individual-specific uncertainty

Códigos JEL:

D72, D74, D81

Área de investigación:

Macroeconomía y Economía Internacional

Publicado en:

The American Economic Review, 94 (3), 785-795, June 2004
Con el título:
Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty: Comment

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