Paper #529

Título:

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Autor:

Nuno Garoupa

Data:

Noviembre 2000

Resumen:

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees.

Palabras clave:

Law Enforcement, Corporation

Códigos JEL:

K4

Área de investigación:

Economía de la Empresa y Organización Industrial

Publicado en:

Managerial and Decision Economics, 21, 6, (2000), pp.243-252

Descargar el paper en formato PDF