Paper #525

Título:

Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation

Autores:

Enriqueta Aragonés y Andrew Postlewaite

Data:

Septiembre 2000

Resumen:

We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaign rhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over what policy the candidate will implement in case he wins the election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological. Voter's strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates that renege of their campaign promises, and in equilibrium all campaign promises are believed by voters, and honored by candidates. We obtain that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate's reputation.

Palabras clave:

Electoral campaigns, reputation, commitment

Códigos JEL:

D72

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía

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