Paper #410

Título:

Financial intermediation and equity investment with costly monitoring

Autor:

Giorgio Di Giorgio

Data:

Septiembre 1999

Resumen:

This paper studies the efficiency of equilibria in a productive OLG economy where the process of financial intermediation is characterized by costly state verification. Both competitive equilibria and Constrained Pareto Optimal allocations are characterized. It is shown that market outcomes can be socially inefficient, even when a weaker notion than Pareto optimality is considered.

Palabras clave:

Financial intermediation, costly state verification, Constrained Pareto Optimality

Códigos JEL:

E44, E62

Área de investigación:

Finanzas y Contabilidad

Publicado en:

International Review of Economcis and Finance, vol.11, 2002

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