Paper #351

Título:

Credit cycles in theory and experiment

Autores:

Antoni Bosch-Domènech y María Sáez

Data:

Enero 1999

Resumen:

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetric game -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study its evolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests its predictions. The model provides conditions for the existence of credit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seem to be good approximations of the experimental results.

Palabras clave:

Cycles, evolutionary dynamics, games, experiments, Leex

Códigos JEL:

C7, C9, E3

Área de investigación:

Economía Experimental y del Comportamiento

Publicado en:

Games and Economic Behavior, 36, (2001), pp. 105-137

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