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Paper #1947

Título:
Multilateral bargaining with information spillovers
Autores:
Vladimir Asriyan, William Fuchs y Caio Lorecchio
Fecha:
Julio 2026
Resumen:
We study dynamic monopoly pricing with multiple buyers whose privately known valuations are correlated, so one buyer’s purchase reveals information about others. Without seller commitment, these information spillovers alter future pricing incentives and feed back into current demand. They generate strategic complementarities in buyers’ purchase decisions, making demand nonmonotone and giving rise to equilibrium multiplicity. Information spillovers can strengthen or weaken the seller’s effective commitment power, implying that seller revenue, buyer surplus, and welfare can be nonmonotone in spillover strength. We characterize when these spillovers encourage data investment and experimentation, as well as facilitate coordination that mitigates hold-up.
Palabras clave:
Dynamic monopoly pricing, information spillovers, strategic complementarities, equilibrium multiplicity, commitment
Códigos JEL:
D42, D82, D83.
Área de investigación:
Macroeconomía y Economía Internacional

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