Paper #1911

Título:

Safe implementation in mixed nash equilibrium

Autores:

Anand Chopra, Malachy James Gavan y Antonio Penta

Fecha:

Junio 2025

Resumen:

Safe Implementation (Gavan and Penta, 2025) combines standard implementation with the requirement that the implementing mechanism is such that, if up to k agents deviate from the relevant solution concept, the outcomes that are induced are still ‘acceptable’ at every state of the world. In this paper, we study Safe Implementation of social choice correspondences in mixed Nash Equilibrium. We identify a condition, Set-Comonotonicity, which is both necessary and (under mild domain restrictions) almost sufficient for this implementation notion.

Palabras clave:

Implementation, mechanism design, robustness, safe implementation, mixed implementation, Set-Comonotonicity

Códigos JEL:

C72, D82

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía

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