Paper #185

Título:

Does eeasoning enhance learning?

Autor:

Nicolaas J. Vriend

Data:

Octubre 1996

Resumen:

Utilizing the well-known Ultimatum Game, this note presents the following phenomenon. If we start with simple stimulus-response agents, learning through naive reinforcement, and then grant them some introspective capabilities, we get outcomes that are not closer but farther away from the fully introspective game-theoretic approach. The cause of this is the following: there is an asymmetry in the information that agents can deduce from their experience, and this leads to a bias in their learning process.

Palabras clave:

Ultimatum game, game theory, reasoning, reinforcement learning, Leex

Códigos JEL:

C7, D8

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía

Publicado en:

Economics Letters, 55, No. 1, 9-18, 1997

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