Paper #178

Título:

Bargaining, coalitions and competition

Autores:

Nir Dagan, Roberto Serrano y Oscar Volij

Data:

Junio 1996

Resumen:

We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalence results between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the case of indivisible goods.

Palabras clave:

Finite coalitions, strategic bargaining, core, Walrasian equilibrium

Códigos JEL:

D51, D41, C78

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía

Publicado en:

Economic Theory, 15, 279-296, 2000

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