Paper #1690

Título:

Optimal contracts with randomly arriving tasks

Autores:

Daniel Bird y Alexander Frug

Fecha:

Enero 2020

Resumen:

Workers rarely perform exactly the same tasks every day. Instead, their daily workload may change randomly over time to comply with the uctuating needs of the organiza- tion where they are employed. In this paper, we show that this typical randomness in workplaces has a striking eect on the structure of long-term employment contracts. In particular, simple intertemporal variability in the worker's tasks is sucient to gen- erate a rich promotion-based dynamics in which, occasionally, the worker receives a (permanent) wage raise and his future work requirements are reduced.

Palabras clave:

Dynamic contracting, random tasks, seniority, promotion.

Códigos JEL:

D86, M51

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía

Descargar el paper en formato PDF (372 Kb)