Paper #1690
- Título:
- Optimal contracts with randomly arriving tasks
- Autores:
- Daniel Bird y Alexander Frug
- Fecha:
- Enero 2020
- Resumen:
- Workers rarely perform exactly the same tasks every day. Instead, their daily workload may change randomly over time to comply with the uctuating needs of the organiza- tion where they are employed. In this paper, we show that this typical randomness in workplaces has a striking e ect on the structure of long-term employment contracts. In particular, simple intertemporal variability in the worker's tasks is sucient to gen- erate a rich promotion-based dynamics in which, occasionally, the worker receives a (permanent) wage raise and his future work requirements are reduced.
- Palabras clave:
- Dynamic contracting, random tasks, seniority, promotion.
- Códigos JEL:
- D86, M51
- Área de investigación:
- Microeconomía
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