Paper #162

Título:

Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

Autores:

Enriqueta Aragonés y Zvika Neeman

Data:

Enero 1994

Resumen:

Many have observed that political candidates running for election are often purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In this paper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model the electoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In the first stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies, and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity. Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustained in equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variable for the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the same electoral objectives end up ``separating'', that is, assuming different ideological positions.

Palabras clave:

Ambiguous platforms, ideological differentiation

Códigos JEL:

D72

Área de investigación:

Economía Laboral, Pública, de Desarrollo y de la Salud

Publicado en:

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12, 2, (2000), pp. 183-204

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