Paper #1501

Título:

The role of frames, numbers and risk in the frequency of cooperation

Autores:

Antoni Bosch-Domènech y Joaquim Silvestre

Data:

Diciembre 2015

Resumen:

We report on a simple experiment that addresses three factors in the frequency of cooperation: (i) framing, (ii) the number of players and (iii) the perceived risk of cooperating. We work with a (two-player) Prisoner’s Dilemma and with a three-player, two-strategy Public Good Game. These themes have been separately studied by a large number of experimental papers, using diverse methodologies. Our experiment targets them in a common, clear-cut framework. We find three strong effects (a) Framing; (b) The number of players (there is less cooperation in the three-person games that in the two-person ones); (c) The neutralization of risk (about 50% of participants cooperate when risk is neutralized). Both (a) and (c) go in the expected direction but, in all three cases, the strength of the effect is surprising.

Palabras clave:

Cooperation, Framing, Prisoner's Dilemma, Risk, Public Good Game, Voluntary Contribution Game.

Códigos JEL:

C74, C91, D74, H41

Área de investigación:

Economía Experimental y del Comportamiento / Microeconomía

Publicado en:

International Review of Economics, February 2017, p. 1-23

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