Paper #1302

Título:

A foundation for strategic agenda voting

Autores:

Jose Apesteguia, Miguel Ballester y Yusufcan Masatlioglu

Data:

Febrero 2012

Resumen:

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

Palabras clave:

Strategic Voting, Agendas, Committees, Institutions, Axioms

Códigos JEL:

C72, D02, D71, D72

Área de investigación:

Economía Experimental y del Comportamiento / Microeconomía

Publicado en:

Games and Economic Behavior, 87: 91-99, September 2014

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