Paper #1152

Título:

Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

Autores:

Doh-Shin Jeon y Domenico Menicucci

Data:

Febrero 2009

Resumen:

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affects competition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each seller has an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze the consequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

Palabras clave:

Bundling, Portfolios, Slots (or Shelf Space), Pure Bundling, Slotting Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, Foreclosure

Códigos JEL:

D4, K21, L13, L41, L82

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía

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