Paper #1094

Título:

Cooperative games in strategic form

Autores:

Sergiu Hart y Andreu Mas-Colell

Data:

Mayo 2008

Resumen:

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash’s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to “threats.” We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

Palabras clave:

Bargaining, Commitment, Nash variable threat

Códigos JEL:

C7, D5, D7

Área de investigación:

Microeconomía

Descargar el paper en formato PDF