Paper #1064
- Título:
- On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices
- Autores:
- Antoni Bosch-Domènech y Nicolaas J. Vriend
- Data:
- Febrero 2008
- Resumen:
- Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibrium and is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players' choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act as an equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closely related small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well as experimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordination devices.
- Palabras clave:
- Coordination game, Focal point, Nash equilibrium, Equilibrium selection, Coordination device, LeeX
- Códigos JEL:
- C72, C91
- Área de investigación:
- Economía Experimental y del Comportamiento
- Publicado en:
- Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Volume 94, Pages 52-67, October 2013.
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