Paper #1031

Título:

Fragile markets: An experiment on judicial independence

Autores:

Benito Arruñada y Marco Casari

Data:

Abril 2007

Resumen:

Contract enforcement does not only affect single transactions but the market as a whole. We compare alternative institutions that allocate enforcement rights to the different parties to a credit transaction: either lenders, borrowers, or judges. Despite all parties having incentives to enforce and transact, the market flourishes or disappears depending on the treatment: paying judges according to lenders' votes maximizes total surplus and equity; and a similar result appears when judges are paid according to average earnings in society. In contrast, paying judges according to borrowers' votes generates the poorest and most unequal society. These results suggest that parties playing the role of borrowers understand poorly the systemic consequences of their decisions, triggering under-enforcement, and hence wasting profitable trade opportunities.

Palabras clave:

impersonal exchange, third-party enforcement, steps of reasoning, other-regarding preferences, judicial independence.

Códigos JEL:

C91, C92, D53, D63, D72, K40

Área de investigación:

Economía Experimental y del Comportamiento / Economía de la Empresa y Organización Industrial

Publicado en:

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Forthcoming

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