Paper #783

Title:

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

Authors:

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

Date:

October 2004

Abstract:

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su±ces to recall the last two periods of play.

Keywords:

Uncoupled, Nash equilibrium, stochastic dynamics, bounded recall

JEL codes:

C7, D83

Area of Research:

Microeconomics

Published in:

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 57, Num. 2, p. 286-303, Nov. 2006

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