Paper #670

Title:

Combating corruption in international business transactions

Authors:

Marco Celentani, Juan José Ganuza and José L. Peydró

Date:

March 2003 (Revised: October 2003)

Abstract:

We analyze the impact of different types of international conventions that require signatory countries to penalize domestic firms that are found to have bribed foreign public officials. We analyze enforcement of penalties under a convention styled after the OECD's 'Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions', in which signatory countries commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed public officials of any foreign country. We compare the results with the case in which the convention requires signatory countries to commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only. We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensure enforcement of penalties on firms found to have bribed foreign public officials.

Keywords:

International corruption, OECD convention

JEL codes:

C72, D72, F23, K42

Area of Research:

Business Economics and Industrial Organization / Microeconomics

Published in:

Economica, Vol. 71, No. 283, pp. 417-448, August 2004

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