Paper #529

Title:

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Author:

Nuno Garoupa

Date:

November 2000

Abstract:

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees.

Keywords:

Law Enforcement, Corporation

JEL codes:

K4

Area of Research:

Business Economics and Industrial Organization

Published in:

Managerial and Decision Economics, 21, 6, (2000), pp.243-252

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