Paper #481

Title:

A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

Authors:

Nuno Garoupa and Joao E. Gata

Date:

June 2000

Abstract:

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

Keywords:

Conflict management, international sanctions, arms embargo, international political market, pressure groups

JEL codes:

C72, D74, K33

Area of Research:

Business Economics and Industrial Organization

Published in:

Public Choice, 110, 1, (2002), pp. 41-65

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