Paper #387

Title:

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

Authors:

Sjaak Hurkens and Karl H. Schlag

Date:

April 1999

Abstract:

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Keywords:

Evolutionarily stable sets, pure coordination, cheap talk

JEL codes:

C72,C79

Area of Research:

Microeconomics

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