Paper #1947
- Title:
- Multilateral bargaining with information spillovers
- Authors:
- Vladimir Asriyan, William Fuchs and Caio Lorecchio
- Date:
- July 2026
- Abstract:
- We study dynamic monopoly pricing with multiple buyers whose privately known valuations are correlated, so one buyer’s purchase reveals information about others. Without seller commitment, these information spillovers alter future pricing incentives and feed back into current demand. They generate strategic complementarities in buyers’ purchase decisions, making demand nonmonotone and giving rise to equilibrium multiplicity. Information spillovers can strengthen or weaken the seller’s effective commitment power, implying that seller revenue, buyer surplus, and welfare can be nonmonotone in spillover strength. We characterize when these spillovers encourage data investment and experimentation, as well as facilitate coordination that mitigates hold-up.
- Keywords:
- Dynamic monopoly pricing, information spillovers, strategic complementarities, equilibrium multiplicity, commitment
- JEL codes:
- D42, D82, D83.
- Area of Research:
- Macroeconomics and International Economics
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