Paper #1911

Title:

Safe implementation in mixed nash equilibrium

Authors:

Anand Chopra, Malachy James Gavan and Antonio Penta

Date:

June 2025

Abstract:

Safe Implementation (Gavan and Penta, 2025) combines standard implementation with the requirement that the implementing mechanism is such that, if up to k agents deviate from the relevant solution concept, the outcomes that are induced are still ‘acceptable’ at every state of the world. In this paper, we study Safe Implementation of social choice correspondences in mixed Nash Equilibrium. We identify a condition, Set-Comonotonicity, which is both necessary and (under mild domain restrictions) almost sufficient for this implementation notion.

Keywords:

Implementation, mechanism design, robustness, safe implementation, mixed implementation, Set-Comonotonicity

JEL codes:

C72, D82

Area of Research:

Microeconomics

Download the paper in PDF format