Paper #1851
- Title:
- Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets: Theories of harm for abuse cases
- Author:
- Massimo Motta
- Date:
- December 2022
- Abstract:
- Antitrust agencies all over the world have been investigating large digital platforms for practices which may constitute an abuse of dominance. Here I discuss practices (including "selfpreferencing" and denial or degradation of interoperability) which can be interpreted as foreclosure in vertically-related or complementary markets. I discuss in particular a few high-profile cases involving Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google. I focus on possible theories of harm for such cases and show that both original simple models and well-established economic theories (adapted or interpreted) provide a rationale for anti-competitive foreclosure.
- Keywords:
- self-preferencing, abuse of dominance, monopolization, exclusionary practices, digital platforms, two-sided markets, vertical foreclosure
- JEL codes:
- D40, K21,L10, L40
- Area of Research:
- Microeconomics
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