Back to all papers

Paper #1691

Title:
On strategic transmission of gradually arriving information
Author:
Alexander Frug
Date:
December 2019
Abstract:
The main insight of the literature on strategic information transmission is that even a small conflict of interest between a fully informed sender (e.g., a financial adviser) and an uninformed receiver (an investor) often poses considerable difficulties for effective communication. However, in many real-life situations, the sender is not fully informed at the outset but gradually studies the case before offering advice. The gradual arrival of information to the sender weakens the strategic barriers between the players and significantly improves communication.
JEL codes:
D82, D83
Area of Research:
Microeconomics

Download the paper in PDF format (560 Kb)

Search Working Papers


By Date:
-when used a value in each of the four fields must be selected-



Predefined Queries