Paper #161

Title:

A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation

Author:

Roberto Serrano

Date:

March 1996

Abstract:

The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are made compatible with the framework of the theory of implementation. This is done through a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibility problems, thereby allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the payoff space. In this framework, we show that the core is the only major cooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of most cooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept (like most papers in the Nash program do). Finally, the mechanisms in the Nash program are adapted into the model.

Keywords:

Nash program, implementation

JEL codes:

C71, C72, D70

Area of Research:

Microeconomics

Published in:

Economics Letters, 55, 203-208, 1997

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