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Paper #1608

Title:
Blockchain: The birth of decentralized governance
Authors:
Benito Arruñada and Luis Garicano
Date:
April 2018
Abstract:
By allowing networks to split, decentralized blockchain platforms protect members against hold up, but hinder coordination, given that adaptation decisions are ultimately decentralized. The current solutions to improve coordination, based on �premining� cryptocoins, taxing members and incentivizing developers, are insufficient. For blockchain to fulfill its promise and outcompete centralized firms, it needs to develop new forms of �soft� decentralized governance (anarchic, aristocratic, democratic, and autocratic) that allow networks to avoid bad equilibria.
Keywords:
blockchain, platforms, networks, hold‐up, coordination, relational capital, incomplete contracts, decentralized governance
JEL codes:
D23, L12, L22, L86
Area of Research:
Business Economics and Industrial Organization

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